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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
CASE NO. 20070747-CA
Plaintiff,
vs.
DARIN RICHARDSON,
Defendant.
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The State's argument that Mr. Richardson's claims are not preserved is
without merit. The errors raised by Mr. Richardson resulted in his sentence being
imposed in an unlawful manner. Therefore, they may be considered for the first
time on appeal under Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Further, the errors were plain.
The State's contention that Mr, Richardson admitted breaching the plea
agreement is unfounded. Mr. Richardson's claims demonstrating that it was
impossible or impracticable for him to perform under the plea agreement are
defenses to, not admissions of breach. Therefore, the State is not excused in its
failure to recommend at sentencing that Mr. Richardson not be incarcerated.

ARGUMENT
L

THIS COURT SHOULD CONSIDER MR. RICHARDSON'S
CLAIMS UNDER THE PLAIN ERROR DOCTRINE AND RULE
22(e).
The State argues that Mr. Richardson's claims involving errors that

occurred at the time of sentencing and that directly affected the sentence imposed
should be dismissed because they were not preserved below. BRIEF OF APPELLEE
("Br. Appe.") at 7-10, This argument is without merit. The State does not address
the applicable rule and preservation issues implicated by the fact that the errors
Mr. Richardson details in his opening brief occurred at the time of sentencing
when the district court issued its final order in this case, while concurrently and
immediately ordering Mr. Richardson into custody and precluding his attempts to
say anything further or to talk to his attorney. R122:13.
Rule 22 (e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides, "The court
may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any
time." This rule permits an appellate court to review errors that occur at the time
of sentencing for the first time on appeal. State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856 (Utah
1995). The appellate court's ability under Rule 22 (e) to consider sentencing
errors for the first time on appeal eliminates the need to establish plain error. State
v. Wanosik, 31 P.3d 615 (Utah App. 2001), ajfd, 79 P.3d 937 (Utah 2003).
Mr. Richardson's sentence was imposed in an illegal manner because the
district court found him in breach of the plea agreement based on the State's
unilateral representations and without a hearing. See, Br. Appt, 7-13. Based on
2

its finding of breach that disregarded Mr. Richardson's defenses and only relied
upon the prosecution's unilateral representations, the district court declined to
follow the plea agreement's recommendation for no jail time and sentenced Mr.
Richardson to 180 days in jail with credit for 51 days served. R122:l 1-13.
Mr. Richardson's liberty was taken away without affording him an
adequate opportunity to present evidence of his compliance with the plea
agreement in his own defense. In other words and as he argues in his opening
brief, at the sentencing hearing Mr. Richardson was deprived of his liberty without
due process of law such that his sentence was imposed in an illegal manner. Utah
R. Crim. P. 22(e). Because Rule 22(e) applies, the State's argument that Mr.
Richardson's claims are not preserved has no merit and this Court should consider
his claims brought for the first time on appeal.
Moreover, Mr. Richardson argues in his opening brief that "the district
court's failure to G afford him the chance to defend himself was plain error."
BRIEF OF APPELLANT ("Br. Appt.") at 13. A plain error is one that occurred, is
harmful and should have been obvious to the trial court. State v. Beck, 2007 UT
60, f 10. An error is harmful if "absent the error there is a reasonable likelihood of
a more favorable outcome for the defendant." Id.
As he argues in his opening brief, it was a violation of Mr. Richardson's
right to due process of law and thus error for the trial court to make a finding of
breach based on the State's unilateral representations. Br. Appt. at 7-9. This error
should have been obvious to the trial court. Tne due process clauses of both the

3

state and federal constitutions provide that no person may be deprived of liberty
without due process of law. United States Constitution, Fifth Amend.; Utah
Constitution, Article I, Section 7. It is also established under Utah law that plea
agreements "are binding on the parties and the court once the plea is entered and
accepted." State v. Kay, 111 P.2d 1294, 1304 (Utah 1986).
Because the issue of material breach is a question of fact, whether the
proceeding is civil or criminal both parties must be afforded an adequate
opportunity to present evidence on the question. See, Br. Appt. at 13. Breach
cannot be determined upon the unilateral representations of one party. Due
process requires that a defendant be afforded therightto a hearing including the
right to present evidence before afindingof breach can be made, particularly in a
criminal case where a defendant's personal liberty is at stake. See, Foote v. Board
ofPardons, 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 1991) (holding that inmates have arightto due
process at Board of Pardons hearings).
The State incorrectly asserts Mr. Richardson "does not cite to a single case
interpreting the right [to have an evidentiary hearing to determine breach of the
plea agreement]." Br. Appe. at 16. However, Mr. Richardson quotes at length
from the 10th Circuit's opinion in United States v. Calabrese, 645 F.2d 1379,
1390 (10th Cir. 1981) wherein the court specifically holds that a defendant is
entitled to an evidentiary hearing to determine whether a plea agreement has been
breached because "[tjhe question of a defendant's breach is not an issue to be
finally determined unilaterally by the government." Id. at 1390 (Br. Appt. at 10).
4

Mr. Richardson also cites Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971), which
Calabrese relies upon, wherein the Supreme Court's holding centers around the
important due process rights involved in the context of plea agreements and
requires "safeguards to insure the defendant what is reasonably due under the
circumstances." Id. at 262 (Br. Appt. at 10).
This legal precedent can hardly be described as a failure to "cite to a single
case" in support of Mr. Richardson's claim that due process requires an
evidentiary hearing on the question before breach of the plea agreement can be
found. Santobello was decided more than thirty years ago and Calabrese more
than twenty. That due process principles apply in the context of plea agreements
is not new or obscure law but is well-settled. Thus, it should have been obvious to
the trial court that due process requires giving Mr. Richardson an adequate
opportunity to present evidence in his own defense before a determination of
breach can be made.
Further, the trial court's error is harmful to Mr. Richardson in that there is a
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome had he been given the
opportunity to present evidence in his own defense. Mr. Richardson explained to
the trial court how he lost a business client because his sentencing was continued
the first time, which reduced his income and made him unable to make full
payments, although he had continued to make monthly payments. R122:, 7-8,11.
The fact that Mr. Richardson was current in his obligations when the sentencing
was first scheduled corroborates this claim. Rl22:2-6, 10-11.
5

Mr. Richardson's ability to pay was also adversely affected by his prior
incarceration but he represented he had made monthly payments subsequent to his
arraignment totaling $2,560. R122:6, 10. Mr. Richardson claimed he had made
diligent efforts and had done everything he could have been expected to do; he
also indicated he was developing his business and had an opportunity to take
additional clients and thereby raise his income substantially. R122:6-7, 9. Mr.
Richardson also explained that he had experienced serious medical problems just
prior to sentencing in August 2007. R122:9. Mr. Richardson was seeking to
procure health insurance both for himself and for his children. R122:9.
Had Mr. Richardson been afforded the opportunity to present evidence
supporting his claims, there is a reasonable likelihood he would have been excused
from full performance under the plea agreement on the basis that his frill
performance was impossible or highly impracticable. Western Properties v.
Southern Utah Aviation, 776 P.2d 656, 658 (Utah App. 1989). Thus it was plain
and harmful error for the trial court to make a finding of breach and consequently
incarcerate Mr. Richardson without affording him due process of law.
The State's argument that Mr. Richardson's claims are not preserved lack
merit because the district court's errors occurred at the time of sentencing and
resulted in Mr. Richardson being sentenced without due process of law and in an
unlawful manner. Therefore, Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
allows this Court to consider his claims for the first time on appeal. Further, the
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district court committed plain error when it found Mr. Richardson in breach of the
plea agreement.
II.

THE STATE'S CLAIM THAT MR. RICHARDSON ADMITTED
HE WAS IN BREACH OF THE PLEA AGREEMENT IS
INCORRECT
The State argues the prosecution was excused from its obligation to

recommend no jail time because Mr. Richardson admitted he had breached the
plea agreement. Br. Appe. at 10-14. This factual representation is incorrect and
not supported by the record wherein Mr. Richardson asserted he was unable to
fully perform but never admitted to breaching the plea agreement. R122. In fact,
the word "breach" cannot be found in any of Mr. Richardson's representations. Id.
As detailed both in the previous section and in Mr. Richardson's opening
brief, he claimed he was unable to meet his payment obligations between May 11,
2007 (when he was current), and his sentencing in August 2007. The State
acknowledges Mr. Richardson was in compliance with the plea agreement on May
11, 2007 when he was supposed to be sentenced. Br. Appe. at 11. Hie apparent
fact that Adult Probation and Parole did not timely provide the district court with
the presentence investigation report is not Mr. Richardson's fault. R134; Br.
Appe. at 13.l

1

Mr, Richardson's counsel did not have the transcript from the hearing on May 11,
2007 when the opening brief was prepared but relied instead on the minute entry
that suggests the presentence investigation report was not completed at that time.
In any event, Mr. Richardson was prejudiced by the delay because he was current
in his payment obligations on May 11, 2007. R99-100;R122:2-6, 10-11; R134.
7

The State liberally and incorrectly construes Mr. Richardson's explanations
for why he was unable to meet his obligations between May and August 2007 as
an admission that he was in breach of the plea agreement. However, explaining
that one is unable to perform one's contractual obligations is a defense that
excuses performance, not an admission of breach. See, Allen v. Prudential
Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 798, 815 (Utah 1992) (explaining
impossibility or impracticability excuse contract performance).
The State is simply making the same error the district court made when it
refused to accept Mr. Richardson's claims of impossibility or impracticability as
valid defenses to breach. The State's argument that these defenses are not
preserved because they were not explicitly mentioned during the sentencing
hearing (Br. Appe. at 14) is defeated under Rule 22(e). Further, the fact that Mr.
Richardson and his counsel argued at length that his performance was impossible
or impracticable, without using those precise terms, further defeats the State's
argument. See, R122:6-ll.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Richardson agrees with the State's observation that if he prevails on the
issues raised in this appeal, the appropriate remedy is to remand this matter to the
district court for an evidentiary hearing on the question of breach. In the event the
evidence demonstrates Mr. Richardson's performance was excused by the

Thus the State would have presumably recommended no incarceration pursuant to
the plea agreement.
8

doctrines of impossibility or impracticability, the State's failure to comply with the
plea agreement should be construed as a material breach and Mr. Richardson
should be permitted to withdraw his plea.
Respectfully submitted this 4th day of August, 2008.
A
/

Jenifer K^Gowans
Attorney for Mr. Richardson
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